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Will They Take the Money and Work?
An Empirical Analysis of People’s Willingness to Delay Claiming
Social Security Benefits for a Lump Sum
Against the backdrop of global population aging, policymakers around the world are
actively seeking ways to reform their nations’ Social Security systems by encouraging delayed
retirement. Many countries have done so by requiring raising retirement ages and cutting benefit
payouts, but this is usually a politically fraught process.1 By contrast, the present paper explores
an alternative approach to encourage delayed claiming by offering people a lump sum. That is, we
investigate whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit -- currently paid in
form of an increased annuity benefit -- for an actuarially fair lump sum payment would induce
people to voluntarily delay claiming and work longer.
Under the Social Security system’s rules currently in effect, i.e., the status quo, an eligible
individual can claim retirement benefits as early as age 62 or as late as age 70.2 His monthly benefit
paid for life depends on his earnings history and his claiming age, with a reduction if he claims
prior to his Full Retirement Age (FRA), and an increment for deferring claiming after that age. For
someone born in 1960 or later, for example, deferring the benefit from age 62 to his FRA of 67
would entitle him to an increase in monthly benefits of around 43 percent (see Table 1 below).3
Deferring claiming to age 70 would imply a 77 percent increase in lifetime monthly benefits.

1

See Brown (2012) and Turner (2009) for a survey of retirement age changes and benefit adjustments around the
world.
2
That is, the delayed retirement credit computation stops after age 69. This abstracts from any possible benefit
recomputation that could take place if the individual were to work after that age (see
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.07/handbook-0722.html)
3
For additional information on the status quo benefit formula, see http://www.ssa.gov/retirement/retirement.htm. The
Social Security delayed retirement credit was intended to be actuarially fair at the time the law was passed; this was
consistent with average mortality tables at the time, as well as a 2.9% real assumed interest rate. In this paper we
assume the same real interest rate. As Shoven and Slavov (2012) note, in such a case the delayed retirement credit
will be better than actuarially fair for most people, thus embodying additional incentives to defer retirement.
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Despite these rewards for delayed retirement, a large share of Americans claims benefits
and stops working around age 62.4 Several authors have offered behavioral explanations for this
phenomenon, arguing for instance that people are persuaded to claim early due to behavioral
framing considerations (e.g., Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell 2013). By contrast, here we
build on our previous theoretical paper on life cycle portfolio choice and claiming behavior (Chai,
Maurer, Mitchell and Rogalla 2013). There we demonstrated that rational consumers would, in
fact, optimally delay claiming their benefits when offered the chance to receive their delayed
retirement credits as a lump sum payment, instead of an increase in lifetime annuity benefits. The
present study seeks to put that hypothesis to a test by empirically evaluating who and how much
people might defer claiming for a lump sum in lieu of a higher monthly payment for life.
To do so, we have developed a survey of U.S. residents within the framework of RAND’s
American Life Panel (ALP) and used it to assess how people might actually respond to having
access to the present value of the benefit increases resulting from longer work lives. We first
compute each respondent’s anticipated monthly Social Security benefit if he claimed at each age
from 62 to 70, which are, respectively, the earliest and the latest claiming ages under the status
quo system rules. Then given this information, we ask each individual to report his expected
claiming age (i.e., the Status Quo claiming age). Next, we present each respondent with two
alternative scenarios, and we again ask him to report his expected claiming age under both options.
In one case, he is told to assume that he would receive lifelong monthly income in the amount of
his age-62 Social Security benefit from his claiming date on, irrespective of when he actually

4

Several studies have examined claiming patterns under the existing Social Security rules; see Gustman and
Steinmeier (2005); Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011); Chai, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2013) and
Shoven and Slavov (2012). Other authors have taken a behavioral finance perspective to examine whether people
might be willing to give up some of their benefit stream in exchange for a lump sum; however they do not link this to
continued work; see Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013).
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claimed. This benefit would be paired with a lump sum payable as of his claiming date (i.e., the
Lump Sum claiming age), where the amount is equal to the actuarial present value of his delayed
retirement credit, i.e. the increase in lifetime retirement benefits generated by claiming after age
62. In the other case, he is told to assume that his monthly benefit would be adjusted upward for
delayed claiming, until his FRA as under the status quo. For claiming ages later than that, his
monthly benefit would be fixed at the FRA level, and he would receive a lump sum payable as of
his claiming date (i.e., the Delayed Lump Sum claiming age) equal to the present value of the
delayed retirement credit after the Full Retirement Age.5 Moreover, in each scenario we ask the
respondent to record how much additional work he would engage in, depending on the specific
scenario.
Our findings show that people would voluntarily work longer if they were offered an
actuarially fair lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. The delays
in claiming are about half a year on average if the lump sum is paid on claiming after age 62, and
about two-thirds of a year if the lump sum is paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement
Age. Moreover, those most responsive to these incentives turn out to be those who would claim
early under the status quo. We also find that people would voluntarily work about one-third of the
delay in claiming time in the Lump Sum scenario, whereas they would work almost half of the
additional time in the Delayed Lump Sum scenario. To the extent that workers can be incentivized
to voluntarily delay retirement in exchange for lump sums, they will also pay Social Security
payroll taxes for additional years which could help the system’s solvency. Moreover, there is some

5

This scenario is not the same as the “File and Suspend” approach currently permitted under Social Security rules
(www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/suspend), where a worker can file for a benefit at or after the FRA, and suspend his
payment. Later, he can then retroactively begin his benefit payment as of the filing data and receive a lump sum for
benefits foregone. This is not equivalent to our scenario because the “File and Suspend” lump sum is backwardlooking and it is not related to the delayed claiming adjustment that we focus on here.
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evidence suggesting that continued labor force participation results in improved physical and
mental health among the elderly, which could improve both individual quality of life as well as
the financial status of healthcare systems such as Medicare and Medicaid (Sahlgren 2013).
In the Social Security context, we are not the first to suggest that lump sum benefits could
be used to replace the delayed retirement credit under Social Security (Orszag 2001;
Fetherstonhaugh and Ross 1999). Nevertheless, neither previous study examined how the claiming
decision differs from the work effort decision, nor did they examine which individuals might be
more likely to change behavior given the opportunity to take a lump sum. Here we do both, using
a nationally representative sample of the American population to test hypotheses.

Study Design
We use the American Life Panel (ALP) to implement our field experiment designed in a
survey setting. This is a nationally representative sample of 6,000 households regularly
interviewed over the Internet.6 We designed and implemented our module on a subset of 2,451
respondents, age 40-70, in which we ask them a number of questions regarding their economic and
demographic status. Following Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013), we then take the
respondents through a set of earnings history questions and feed these into a benefit calculator
provided by SSA.7 This generates each individual’s “Primary Insurance Amount” (PIA), which is
the monthly benefit amount for life (adjusted for inflation) that he would receive if he were to

6

One of many advantages the ALP has over other online panels is that it provides respondents who lack Internet
access with either a laptop and Internet access, or a so-called WebTV that allows them to use their television to
participate in the survey. That improves the nationally representative nature of the panel. More on how ALP
respondents are recruited is available on the American Life Panel website: https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/index.php/.
7
Specifically, we ask the respondent his age when he started working and divided the remaining years into subperiods;
in each of these, we asked average earnings and years when the respondent did not work for pay. This generated a
constructed earnings history which could be fed into the SSA calculator, which is available on the SSA’s website at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/anypia/anypia.html. For additional details see Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell
(2013a).
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claim at his FRA. To compute benefits for earlier or later claiming ages, we apply SSA’s actuarial
adjustment factors. Specifically, claiming prior to the FRA results in a benefit reduction of 5/9
percent per month for the first 36 months, and 5/12 percent per month thereafter until age 62.
Claiming after the FRA boosts benefits by 8/12 percent per month up to age 70. One’s FRA
depends one’s birth year: it is age 66 for workers born 1943-1954, rising gradually to age 67 for
the 1960 and later birth cohorts. Table 1 depicts the impact of claiming age on Social Security
benefits, for someone whose FRA is currently age 67.
Table 1 here
Having done so, we ask each individual the following question to survey his expected
claiming behavior under the status quo rules: 8,9
In the next few questions, we are going to ask you to make a number of choices
about Social Security benefits. Please assume that all amounts shown are after tax
(that is, you don’t owe any tax on any of the amounts we will show you). Think of any
dollar amount mentioned in this survey in terms of what a dollar buys you today
(because Social Security will adjust future dollar amounts for inflation).
For the sake of these questions, assume that you are currently age 62 and single.
You are thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit.
The Social Security system allows you to claim your benefit anytime between age
62 and 70. On average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make
money no matter when people claim their benefit. If you claim your benefit at age
62, you will receive an estimated monthly amount of ${SocSec62benest}10 for life.
Please answer the following questions about the choice you would make.
Now imagine you have the following choice:
Either
-

You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life.

Or
-

8

You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive a higher
monthly payment from that age on for life.

Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2013) report that respondent expectations about claiming ages and actual claiming
behavior are highly correlated in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
9
See Figures A1-A4 in the Appendix for screenshots of the questions as presented to the participants.
10
The variable {SocSec62benest} represents our estimate of each respondent’s estimated lifelong monthly social
security benefit when claimed at age 62. We calculate this by adjusting the PIA back to age 62 from his FRA, using
the
appropriate
adjustment
factors
which
depend
on
his
year
of
birth
(see
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/quickcalc/earlyretire.html).
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Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you claim
your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim your
Social Security benefit?

The respondent is asked to click his mouse on a scale that represents the alternative
claiming ages in monthly steps from age 62 to age 70. When he clicks on the scale, he is then
shown his selected claiming age as well as the corresponding monthly benefit he will receive for
life from age onward. Finally, he has the opportunity to change that selected claiming age or submit
his response.11
Subsequently, we ask each respondent about his expected claiming ages under the two
alternative monthly benefit/lump sum scenarios described above. To this end, we compute what
his benefits would be at alternative claiming ages, along with the actuarially fair lump sums.12 In
the Lump Sum case, if the individual were to defer claiming from age 62, he would receive a lump
sum at his claiming date plus monthly benefits in the amount of his age-62 benefit from said date
for life. We present each respondent with the following question to elicit his claiming age under
this scenario:
Next we would like to show you some different questions about Social Security
claiming choices. As before, please assume that all amounts shown are after tax,
and think of any dollar amount in terms of what a dollar buys you today. Again, on
average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make money no matter
when benefits are claimed.

11

If a respondent indicated he believed he would never receive Social Security because of a short earnings history
(fewer than 10 years), we used HRS data to impute to him a PIA for someone with similar age, sex, and education,
and marital status as in Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell (2013). If the respondent indicated he thought that the
system would not be around to pay him benefits, we asked him to assume it would for the purposes of the analysis.
12
Specifically, the lump sum is calculated as the actuarial present value at the claiming age of the increased lifelong
monthly retirement benefits - based on cohort-specific FRA factors according to the current Social Security rules relative to the benefits by claiming at age 62 (or at the FRA in case of the Delayed Lump Sum scenario). Annuity
factors are derived using the mortality probabilities used in the Social Security’s Trustees Report (SSA 2013). These
are transformed into unisex rates assuming 1,000 females for 1,050 males in every birth cohort (Bell, Bye and Winters
2008). We convert yearly to monthly rates assuming constant number of deaths per months. The interest rate to
discount future payments is 2.9% p.a. in compliance with the interest rate of the intermediate cost scenario in the
Social Security’s Trustees Report (SSA 2013).
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Please continue to assume that you are currently age 62 and single. You are still
thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit.
Now, imagine that you had the following choice:
Either
‐

You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life.

Or
‐

You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive the same
monthly payment of ${SocSec62benest} from that age on for life, plus an
additional lump sum payable at that later claiming age.

Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you claim
your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim your
Social Security benefit?

Again, the respondent is shown the monthly benefit and the lump sum amount corresponding to
the claiming age selected, and he can change or submit his selection.
For the Delayed Lump Sum case, the respondent is told he would be entitled to status quo
benefit increments if he delays claiming to his Full Retirement Age. If he defers claiming beyond
that age, he will receive both the FRA benefit stream for life plus a lump sum equivalent to the
actuarial present value of the delayed retirement credit under the Status Quo scenario. The specific
language used to evaluate the claiming age in this case is as follows:
Next we would like to show you some different questions about Social Security
claiming choices. As before, please assume that all amounts shown are after tax,
and think of any dollar amount in terms of what a dollar buys you today. Again, on
average, the Social Security system will neither lose nor make money no matter
when benefits are claimed.
Please continue to assume that you are currently age 62 and single. You are still
thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit.
Now, imagine that you had the following choice:
Either
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at age 62 and receive that $
{SocSec62benest} monthly payment for life.
Or
‐ You can claim your Social Security benefit at a later age and receive a higher
monthly payment from that age onward for life. This benefit will rise as you delay
claiming up to a maximum of ${SocSecFRAbenest}13 if you claim at your full
retirement age. However, if you claim your benefit after your full retirement age,
you will receive that monthly payment of ${SocSecFRAbenest} for life, plus an
13

The variable {SocSecFRAbenest} represents our estimate of the respondent’s lifelong monthly Social Security
benefit when claimed at the FRA.
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additional lump sum payable at your later claiming age.
Assume that you are free to choose your work effort (hours per week) until you claim
your benefit. Based on this information, at what age would you plan to claim your
Social Security benefit?

As before, the respondent is shown the monthly benefit and the lump sum amount corresponding
to the claiming age selected, and he can change or submit his final selection.
An illustrative case of benefit/lump sum combinations attainable under the Status Quo
scenario and the two Lump Sum alternatives appears in Table 2. Here the monthly benefit payable
to a respondent who will claim at age 62 is assumed to be $1,500. Under the Status Quo scenario
(column 1), delaying claiming to age 63 will boost monthly benefits to $1,607. If he defers until
age 70, monthly benefits will mount to $2,657. By contrast, under the Lump Sum scenario (column
2), claiming at age 63 will result in the same monthly benefit of $1,500, along with a lump sum
equal to $20,208 at age 63. In this scenario, when deferring to age 70, the monthly benefit would
continue to remain constant at $1,500. The lump sum payable at age 70, however, would amount
to almost $178,000. The Delayed Lump Sum alternative for the same illustrative individual is
presented in Column 3. As claiming is delayed, monthly benefits increase as under the Status Quo
(Column 1) up to the Full Retirement Age, while the lump sum payment is zero. When claiming
at age 70, the individual receives monthly benefits equal to the FRA benefits of $2,143 plus a lump
sum of around $79,000.
Table 2 here
In each case we also ask how much the respondent would work under that claiming
alternative. Specifically, the wording is as follows:
Given that choice, about how many hours per week, on average, would you plan to
work from age 62 to your claiming age at {ClaimAgeString_Del_LSFRA}14?
14

The variable {ClaimAgeString_Del_LSFRA} represents the claiming age under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario
chosen by the respondent.

9

Once more, the respondent is asked to click his mouse on the scale representing the average weekly
work hours to his claiming age. On clicking, the respondent is shown his selected weekly work
effort, as well as the corresponding number of months of full-time work until his claiming age; we
compute months of full-time work by multiplying the weekly hours by the number of weeks until
his selected claiming age. As before, the respondent can change his selection before submitting his
final answer.
In the survey, each respondent is first asked to select a claiming age under the Status Quo
scenario. Next we randomly assign respondents in terms of whether they first see the Lump Sum
or the Delayed Lump Sum alternative. Randomization in this form allows us to compare how
claiming ages would change across the Status Quo and both lump sum scenarios, as well as to
control for framing effects across respondents.15

Results for Changes in Claiming Ages
In this section, we describe respondents’ claiming ages under the Status Quo, along with
the patterns under the two alternative scenarios. In each case we report how many months post
age-62 the individual selected as his target. The distribution of claiming ages is depicted in Figure
1. Here the box plots denote the 25th and 75th percentiles, with the intermediate lines in each case
reflecting the median; the dots indicate the mean claiming age. Claiming ages under the Status
Quo (top bar) range from 24 and 71 months past age 62; the mean is 45 months. When people can
receive part of their benefit as a lump sum instead of monthly payments, the distribution shifts to
the right, as shown by the second bar. Now people would claim 49.6 months beyond age 62 on

15

For a more in-depth analysis of how framing affects peoples’ perceptions of claiming ages, see Brown, Kapteyn,
and Mitchell (2013) and Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008).

10
average, and the difference to the mean claiming age under Status Quo is statistically significant
at the 1% level. Moreover, the claiming age distribution is compressed on the left, implying that
those who would have claimed quite young are also most likely to delay claiming when the lump
sum becomes available. Less change is evident on the right side of the bar, suggesting that those
claiming later under the status quo would change their behavior less. The final bar illustrates the
pattern of claiming ages when the lump sum is available only to those who claim after their Full
Retirement Age. The mean again rises, now to 53.3 months past age 62, with the difference vs. the
Lump Sum scenario being significant at the 1% level. In other words, the most substantial
behavioral change in claiming ages occurs if people were to be given benefit increments up to the
FRA, as now, and post-FRA, a lump sum instead of monthly benefit increments.
Figure 1 here
To provide an idea of the sizes of the lump sums involved, Figure 2 reports the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles along with the mean values of lump sums payable given peoples’ desired
claiming age patterns. Under the Lump Sum scenario, the mean lump sum would be $73,000, with
a median of $64,500; at the 25th percentile, this amount would almost equal $32,000, and the 75th
percentile value exceeds $105,000. Under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario, because people who
delay receive higher monthly benefits, the lump sums payable for deferring past the FRA are lower,
averaging $22,500, with a median of about $1,600. At the 25th percentile the value is zero, and it
is just over $37,500 at the 75th percentiles. All of these values reflect the actuarially neutral
calculations computed for each individual’s desired claim age.
Figure 2 here
Table 3 provides additional detail on claiming ages for the Status Quo and our two lump
sum alternatives, analyzing average claiming behavior for different demographic groups. Factors

11
we use to differentiate respondents include proxies for their anticipated longevity including age,
sex, and marital status (Smith and Waitzman 1997; Zick and Smith 1991); education (Brown,
Hayward, Karas Montez, Hummer, Chiu, and Hidajat 2012); and subjective life expectancy (Hurd
and McGarry 2002, Hurd, Smith, and Zissimopoulos 2004).16 As discussed above, our respondents
indicate that they intend to claim 45 months post age-62 in the Status Quo setting, on average.
Splitting the sample by demographics, we find that men, singles, those younger than age 62, and
the better-educated all select higher claiming ages than their counterparts. Additionally, people
with optimistic estimates of their remaining life expectancy compared to standard mortality tables
also select later claiming ages.17 Results for the two lump sum scenarios tell the same story, where
all groups boost their claim ages. Moreover, claim ages are consistently the highest under the
Delayed Lump Sum scenario.
Table 3 here
Thus far, we have focused on showing how claiming ages change depending on the
treatment people see, and by their demographic characteristics. Next we adopt a multivariate
regression framework to examine how individuals with particular characteristics might change
their behavior under the two lump sum policy alternatives, holding other factors constant. Results
are presented in Table 4. The three left columns report patterns for the change in claiming ages (in
months) when people see the Lump Sum scenario versus the Status Quo; the right three columns
compare claiming ages from the Delayed Lump Sum alternative versus the Status Quo. For each
dependent variable, the first model (columns 1 and 4) includes only those factors summarized in
Table 3 (sex, marital status, age, education, and whether the individual is optimistic regarding his

16

While respondents’ current health status can also proxy for longevity expectations, we do not include this in our
list of controls as it is highly correlated with subjective life expectancy in our data.
17
Variable descriptions appear in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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life expectancy). The second model (columns 2 and 5) adds a control for the respondent’s claiming
age selected under the Status Quo scenario. This permits us to test whether the lump sum policy
alternatives are likely to incentivize early versus late claimers under the current scenario to delay
claiming. In the third model (columns 3 and 6), we add an additional control for whether the
respondent sees the Lump Sum treatment first (versus the Delayed Lump Sum treatment), as well
as economic covariates: wealth (French 2005); our estimate of the respondent’s age-62 Social
Security benefit; whether the respondent had some other annuity; an indicator for long job tenure;
and a dummy variable indicating the respondent had liquidity constraints (High Debt).
Additionally we have indicators of peoples’ attitudes and preferences including risk aversion,
planning horizon, financial literacy, and an indicator that the respondent was confident in the
Social Security system’s sustainability (c.f., Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, and Brown, Kapteyn, and
Mitchell 2013).18
Table 4 here
Turning to results in column 1, respondent age is positive and statistically significant,
meaning that a 60-year old would claim about three months later (20*0.134) when the lump sum
is available, compared to a 40-year old (ceteris paribus). This finding is compatible with empirical
evidence for time-inconsistent discounting noted by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010,
2012), who showed that people facing a short time horizon were more impatient than those facing
payoffs in a more distant time period. This effect becomes insignificant in column 2, however,
when we control on respondents’ claiming age under the Status Quo. This is partly because
peoples’ ages and claiming ages are correlated (0.14). But interestingly, the Claiming Age SQ term
is highly significant and negative, implying that those who claim early under the Status Quo would

18

Table A1 in the Appendix describes how we constructed these controls in greater detail.
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delay claiming the most under the new policy. Column 2 also shows a positive and significant
relationship between the difference in claiming ages and peoples’ optimism regarding their life
expectancy: that is, people who expect to live longer will claim later, since they are more likely to
live to receive the lump sum at the later age. On average our respondents underestimate their
probability of living to later ages by 14% compared to life tables;19 accordingly, a respondent who
predicted his probabilities accurately would be anticipated to claim about one month later
(0.14*7.142).20
Overall, our estimated effects are robust to the inclusion of the additional controls in
column 3 of Table 4. There we show that the order by which the two lump sum alternatives are
shown to the responded has significant impact on the claiming ages chosen, indicating a potential
anchoring effect. If the respondent first sees the Lump Sum scenario the difference between his
expected claiming ages under the Lump Sum alternative and the Status Quo scenario is almost 4
months smaller than in case the Lump Sum scenario was shown second. This change in claiming
ages is comparable in magnitude to the average Status Quo versus Lump Sum difference. The Lump
Sum scenario provides a substantial lump sum relatively early. Consequently, the respondent might
delay claiming by only a bit. By contrast, those who see the Delayed Lump Sum alternative first
tend to anchor initially on a higher claiming age and smaller lump sum amount. Accordingly, when
presented with the regular Lump Sum scenario second, the respondent delays claiming more,
although not as long as in the Delayed Lump Sum setup.
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See Table A1.
Interestingly, the system’s finances could benefit under the Lump Sum scenario, since people expecting to live
longer than average indicate that they would delay claiming instead of taking an early lifetime annuity based on
population rather than optimistic mortality tables (holding all else constant). It must be recalled that, in this analysis,
people may not choose between the Status Quo versus the Lump Sum scenario.
20
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We also find that persons reporting being debt-constrained say they will defer claiming by
almost two months given the Lump Sum alternative (42 percent of the mean Status Quo versus
Lump Sum difference). Respondents who indicate they are more risk averse also claim later, by
about a month per standard deviation above the mean risk aversion level. This might be due to a
preference for a larger lump sum of known amount compared to a higher annuity with an uncertain
length of payment. Financial literacy is statistically significant, positive, and quantitatively
important: that is, when presented with the Lump Sum option, someone with no financial
knowledge would delay claiming less than the most financially literate individual, by about 3.288
months. This finding is compatible with results in Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell (2013),
who showed that financially illiterate persons have a difficult time comparing annuities versus
lump sums.21 Turning to the Political Trust variable, those having the most confidence in the Social
Security system defer claiming less (by 2.556 months), a sensible finding in that they value the
lump sum less than their more skeptical peers, who seek to cash out of the Social Security system
as much as possible and as early as possible.
The next three columns of Table 4 replicate the previous analysis, but this time the
dependent variable measures the change in claiming age from the Status Quo to that selected in
the Delayed Lump Sum alternative. Interestingly, age is no longer significant in column 4. Since
most respondents in our sample are younger than the FRA, they tend to more heavily discount the
lump sum that will be paid far in the future under the Delayed Lump Sum option. By contrast,
when they were offered early lump sum payments in the previous scenario, they were more
impatient. This is compatible with the time-inconsistent discounting referred to above (Dohmen,
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Several prior studies have examined the links between cognitive abilities and financial decision making; see Fang,
Keane, and Silverman (2008) for Medigap purchase; Agarwal and Mazumder (2013) on the use of credit; and
McArdle, Smith, and Willis (2011) and Banks, O’Dea, and Oldfield (2010) on retirement wealth accumulation.
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Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2012). Other results in columns 5 and 6 are quite comparable in terms
of signs, significance levels, and magnitudes of estimated coefficients, though financial literacy
now has a somewhat larger impact.
Overall, we conclude that offering people lump sums in lieu of higher annuity payments
from Social Security would induce reasonably substantial delays in claiming ages, by about half a
year on average if the lump sum were paid on claiming, and by about two-thirds of a year if the
lump sum were only payable for benefits claimed after the Full Retirement Age. Those deferring
claiming the most under both scenarios are also those who would take their Social Security benefits
early under the Status Quo scenario. Interestingly, only a few factors seem to differentiate those
particularly sensitive to the lump sum offers, including financial literacy which is associated with
a larger claiming delay, and confidence in the program’s sustainability. Additionally, the most
indebted would also delay claiming to obtain the lump sums. Finally, people’s delayed claiming
patterns do not differ by wealth levels, the presence of other annuities, Social Security benefit
amounts, planning horizons, or expected investment returns.

Results for Changes in Work Effort
Having established that people will delay claiming more under both lump sum alternatives
than under the Status Quo scenario, we next turn to an examination of whether people will simply
delay their benefit take-up dates, or whether they will continue to work in the interim. To this end,
we report in Figure 3 the distribution of full-time work effort under the Status Quo versus the two
lump sum scenarios. As before, the box plots represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, with the
intermediate line in each case reflecting the median; the dots reflect the mean months of full-time
work post-age 62 under each case. The top bar, representing full-time work months beyond age 62
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under the Status Quo, ranges from 2 to 53 months (median 32). The mean is 34.8 months. The
second bar, by contrast, shows that the distribution shifts to the right under the Lump Sum scenario,
when people can receive part of their benefit stream as a lump sum instead of as a monthly
payment. Now, on average, people indicate they will work 36.2 full-time months (median 35)
beyond age 62; this difference of 1.4 months is significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the work
effort distribution is now compressed on the left, implying that those who would work least under
the Status Quo are also most likely to work more when the lump sum becomes available. Less
change is evident on the right side of the bar, indicating that individuals who would have worked
more under the Status Quo case would exhibit smaller increments in work effort. The final bar
illustrates the pattern of work effort under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario, where a lump sum is
available only to those who claim after their FRA. Mean work effort again rises, now to 39 months
post-age 62, 3.9 months more than under the Status Quo and 2.5 months more than under the Lump
Sum case. These differences are significant at the 1% level.
Figure 3 here
Additional detail on work patterns under the Status Quo and two lump sum cases is
provided in Table 5, where we again report the number of months of full-time work post age-62
overall (row 1), and also by respondents’ demographic characteristics, i.e. sex, marital status, age,
education, and whether people were optimistic regarding self-assessed life expectancy. A first
point to note is that, under the Status Quo, men, singles, those younger than age 62, and the bettereducated all spend more time working than their counterparts. Moreover, those who are optimistic
about their life expectancy would also elect to expend more work effort. Second, results under
both lump sum scenarios are similar, where all groups boost their work effort. Moreover, work
effort is consistently the highest under the Delayed Lump Sum scenario.
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Table 5 here
Turning to a multivariate regression framework, Table 6 helps us test whether respondents
having particular characteristics differentially change their work patterns under the two lump sum
policy alternatives, holding other factors constant. The three left-hand columns in Table 6 report
estimates of the impact of factors shaping changes in work effort (in full-time months) when people
see the Lump Sum versus the Status Quo scenarios; the three right columns compare work effort
in the Delayed Lump Sum versus the Status Quo scenarios. For each dependent variable, the first
model (columns 1 and 4) includes only those factors summarized in Table 5 (sex, marital status,
age, education, and whether the individual is optimistic regarding his life expectancy). The second
model (columns 2 and 5) adds a control for the respondent’s work effort selected under the Status
Quo scenario. This permits us to test whether and which lump sum policies will incentivize people
exerting modest work effort under the current system to devote more effort to employment. In the
third model (columns 3 and 6), we add an additional control for whether the respondent saw the
Lump Sum treatment first (versus the Delayed Lump Sum treatment), as well as economic
covariates (wealth, age 62 benefit, whether the respondent had some other annuity, an indicator
for long job tenure, and a dummy variable indicating the respondent had high debt). As before, we
also control for indicators of attitudes and preferences, including risk aversion, planning horizon,
financial literacy, and an indicator that the respondent was confident in the Social Security
system’s sustainability (see Table A1 in the Appendix for further detail).
Table 6 here
Results in column 1 show that respondent age is positive and significant; the estimated
coefficient implies that a 60-year old would work three months longer (20*0.153) than a 40-year
old (ceteris paribus). The age effect loses significance in columns 2 and 3, however, after we
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control on the status quo work level. The Total Work SQ term is negative and highly statistically
significant, indicating that those who work less under the Status Quo would work more under the
new policy, and the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of our additional controls in column 3.
We also see that, if the respondent is first presented with the Lump Sum scenario entitling him to
a substantial lump sum relatively early, his work effort is 1.6 months less than when he sees the
Delayed Lump Sum scenario first. This confirms our earlier finding that respondents shown the
Delayed Lump Sum scenario first are incentivized to work more.
The other results in column 3 confirm many of the findings from the equivalent column in
Table 4, in that only a few factors differentiate people who are most sensitive to the lump sum
offers. Once again, given a lump sum, respondents who are very confident in the program’s
sustainability increase their work effort less than those who distrust the system. Wealthy
individuals will also exert less additional work effort, but the risk averse and the debt-constrained
increase work more when offered a lump sum versus the base case. Finally, people’s change in
work effort patterns do not differ depending on the presence of other annuities, Social Security
benefit amounts, planning horizons, or expected investment returns. Results are rather similar in
columns 4-6 of the table, but often coefficient magnitudes are somewhat smaller while having
similar signs and significance levels. Those with most wealth are least likely to increase their work
effort in the Delayed Lump Sum case, as they can self-finance the waiting period before claiming
the lump sum.
Overall, then, providing a lump sum option in lieu of higher annuity payments from Social
Security would induce respondents to work more: by about 1.4 months when the lump sum is paid
for claiming after age 62, and by 3.9 months if the lump sum is payable only for benefits claimed
after the Full Retirement Age. Relating these estimates to the findings in the previous section, we
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conclude that people would voluntarily work about one-third of the additional months of delayed
claiming time in the Lump Sum scenario vs. the Status Quo, and half the additional delay time in
the Delayed Lump Sum scenario vs. the Status Quo.

Conclusions and Implications
The primary contribution of this paper is to employ empirical microeconomic data to
examine how individuals would respond to the chance to exchange part of their Social Security
annuities for a lump sum. We do so to test our hypothesis from a stochastic life-cycle model
commonly used to study annuitization decisions. In our nationally representative sample of
Americans, we show that people would voluntarily work longer, on average, if they were offered
an actuarially fair lump sum instead of a delayed retirement annuity under Social Security. Our
prior theoretical work predicted that they would do so, and our empirical analysis using the ALP
reinforces those predictions.
We show that giving people lump sums in lieu of higher annuity payments from Social
Security induces reasonably substantial delays in claiming ages, by about half a year on average if
the lump sum is paid for claiming after age 62, and by about two-thirds of a year if the lump sum
is payable only for claiming after the Full Retirement Age. Interestingly, those who are most
responsive to these incentives prove to be those who would claim early under the status quo.
Moreover, financial literacy and mistrust in the retirement program’s sustainability are associated
with greater claiming delays; and the indebted would also delay claiming to obtain the lump sums.
Claiming delays do not differ across wealth levels, whether people have other annuities, the level
of their Social Security benefit amounts, their risk aversion or planning horizons, or the investment
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returns they expect on investments. Additionally, we show that people would work one-third to
one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo.
Our findings will interest policymakers seeking ways of reforming Social Security without
raising costs or cutting benefits, while enhancing the incentives to delay retirement. Boosting
Social Security system solvency without cutting benefits appears to be feasible, by offering a fair
lump sum in place of the current delayed retirement credit. As, we have shown, people would
voluntarily extend their work effort due to the lump sum options examined here. This implies that
some workers would pay Social Security payroll taxes for more years. At the same time, given the
well-established decline in average labor income toward the end of the work life, the additional
work period might add little to the lifetime earnings history on which Social Security benefits are
based. Hence the overall solvency of the system could be enhanced. Additionally, from a
macroeconomic perspective, incentivizing longer work lives could also offer additional economic
resources to help cover the costs of population aging (National Research Council 2012), and
working longer may well be associated with better mental and physical health (Rohwedder and
Willis 2009).
In terms of future research directions: our policy experiment was designed to be costneutral to the Social Security system. That is, our approach has the virtue of not imposing
additional solvency concerns on the system nor imposing wealth transfers on the next generation.
It remains to be seen whether people might also be willing to delay claiming and work longer for
smaller-than-actuarially-fair lump sums, which would enhance the system’s sustainability.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Claiming Ages: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives
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Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of claiming ages, with the intermediate lines at the medians.
Black dots represent the mean claiming ages, with differences between the means in the two Lump Sum alternatives
and the mean in the Status Quo scenario significant at the 1% level.

Figure 2: Distribution of Lump Sum Payments under Two Lump Sum Alternatives
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Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of lump sum payments at the claiming ages, with the
intermediate lines at the medians. Black dots represent the mean lump sums.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Total Work Effort: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives
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Notes: Boxes represent the 25% and the 75% quantiles of months of fulltime work (after age 62), with the intermediate
line at the median. Black dot represents the mean number of months of fulltime work, with differences between the
mean in the Lump Sum (Delayed Lump Sum) alternative and the mean in the Status Quo scenario significant at the
10% (1%) level.
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Table 1: Delayed Claiming Boosts Monthly Social Security Benefits: Status Quo
Monthly
Claiming
Boost with 1
Cumulative boost
Benefit:
Age
year delay (%) compared to age 62 (%)
(% of PIA)
62
70
63
75
7.14
7.14
64
80
6.67
14.29
65
86.67
8.34
23.81
66
93.33
7.70
33.33
67
100
7.15
42.86
68
108
8
54.29
69
116
7.41
65.71
70
124
6.90
77.14
Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67; PIA = Primary Insurance Amount. Source: www.ssa.gov.
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Table 2: Illustrative Benefit Impact of Delayed Claiming: Status Quo vs. Two Lump Sum Alternatives
(1)
Status Quo

(2)
Lump Sum

(3)
Delayed Lump Sum

Claiming
Age

Monthly
Benefit

Monthly
Benefit

+

Lump Sum

Monthly
Benefit

+

Lump Sum

62

1,500

1,500

+

0

1,500

+

0

63

1,607

1,500

+

20,208

1,607

+

0

64

1,714

1,500

+

39,382

1,714

+

0

65

1,857

1,500

+

63,887

1,857

+

0

66

2,000

1,500

+

86,963

2,000

+

0

67

2,143

1,500

+

108,589

2,143

+

0

68

2,314

1,500

+

133,427

2,143

+

28,090

69

2,486

1,500

+

156,480

2,143

+

54,428

70
2,657
1,500
+
177,723
2,143
+
78,988
Notes: Full Retirement Age (FRA): 67, Assumed Social Security Benefit at Age 62: $ 1,500. Status Quo refers to the
current Social Security system (column 1). Lump Sum (column 2) holds the monthly benefits constant at all claiming
ages; the lump sum amount payable at the claiming age in that row is the actuarial present value of the difference in
monthly benefits between the Status Quo and those paid in the Lump Sum scenario. Delayed Lump Sum (column 3)
increases monthly benefits to the FRA with no lump sum payment; thereafter monthly benefits are constant and the
lump sum is the actuarial present value of the difference in monthly benefits between the Status Quo and the FRA
benefit. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 3: Mean Claiming Ages (Months after Age 62) under Status Quo and Two Lump Sum Alternatives
(3)
(1)
(2)
Delayed
%
Status Quo Lump Sum
Lump Sum
100
45.0
Overall Sample
49.6
Sex
Male
41.1
46.2
50.2
Female
58.9
44.0
49.2
Marital Status
Married
60.0
43.7
48.8
Non Married
40.0
46.8
50.7
Age
< 62
72.5
46.6
50.7
62-70
27.5
40.7
46.7
Education
HS Dropout
4.2
39.8
45.8
HS Graduate
16.1
34.8
40.0
More than HS
79.7
47.3
51.7
Life Expectancy Assessment
Optimistic
33.5
53.9
57.5
Pessimistic
66.5
40.4
45.6
Notes: For variable descriptions see Appendix. N = 2451. Source: Authors’ calculations.

53.3
53.7
53.0
52.3
54.8
54.8
49.4
47.6
44.1
55.4
60.7
49.6
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Table 4: How Expected Claiming Ages Change given Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Lump Sum
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Delayed Lump Sum
(5)
(6)

Demographic

Male
Married
Age
Education (yrs)
Optimistic Life Exp.

-1.25

-0.89

-1.478*

-1.441

-1.153

-1.690*

(0.916)

(0.836)

(0.888)

(0.899)

(0.849)

(0.902)

1.436

-0.055

-0.581

0.973

-0.216

-0.382

(0.920)

(0.842)

(0.877)

(0.903)

(0.855)

(0.892)

0.134**

-0.056

0.016

0.07

-0.082

0.007

(0.055)

(0.051)

(0.056)

(0.054)

(0.052)

(0.057)

-0.235

0.243

0.081

-0.237

0.144

0.071

(0.181)

(0.167)

(0.185)

(0.178)

(0.169)

(0.188)

-2.127

7.142***

7.074***

-1.795

5.603***

6.288***

(1.872)

(1.759)

(1.783)

(1.839)

(1.786)

(1.813)

-0.298***

-0.306***

-0.238***

-0.246***

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.014)

(0.014)

Experimental

Claiming Age SQ
Saw Lump Sum First

-3.772***

-2.223***

(0.806)

(0.820)

Economic

Wealth 50-100K
Wealth 100K+
Other Annuity
Benefit at Age 62
Long Tenure (10y+)
High Debt

1.037

-0.686

(1.381)

(1.404)

-0.267

-1.627

(1.081)

(1.099)

-0.384

-0.933

(0.887)

(0.902)

0.374

0.902

(1.074)

(1.092)

-0.499

-2.369

(1.720)

(1.749)

1.925**

1.859**

(0.894)

(0.909)

1.074**

0.936**

(0.426)

(0.433)

Attitudes/Preferences

Risk Aversion
Long Term Planner
Risky Investing
High Expected Return
High Spending
Financial Literacy
High Political Trust

0.868

-0.11

(0.877)

(0.892)

-0.226

-0.631

(1.320)

(1.342)

1.351

-0.273

(1.258)

(1.279)

-0.048

0.408

(1.203)

(1.223)

3.288**

4.708***

(1.527)

(1.553)

-2.556***

-3.020***

(0.860)

(0.874)

R-squared
0.005
0.172
0.192
0.004
0.114
0.133
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the claiming ages in the Lump Sum vs. the Status Quo scenario
(in months). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 2451. Missing values controlled.
See Appendix for variable descriptions. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5: Mean Months of Fulltime Work (after Age 62) under Status Quo and Two Lump Sum Alternatives
(3)
(1)
(2)
Delayed
%
Status Quo Lump Sum
Lump Sum
100
Overall Sample
34.8
36.2
Sex
Male
41.1
38.5
40.0
Female
58.9
32.2
33.6
Marital Status
Married
60.0
32.7
34.8
Non Married
40.0
37.9
38.4
Age
< 62
72.5
35.9
36.5
62-70
27.5
32.0
35.4
Education
HS Dropout
4.2
29.5
33.5
HS Graduate
16.1
27.3
28.3
More than HS
79.7
36.6
38.0
Life Expectancy Assessment
Optimistic
33.5
43.5
44.7
Pessimistic
66.5
30.4
32.0
Notes: Variable Descriptions see Appendix. N = 2451. Source: Authors’ calculations.

38.7
42.3
36.1
36.9
41.3
39.5
36.6
34.9
30.9
40.4
46.5
34.7
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Table 6: How Total Work Effort Changes given Two Lump Sum Alternatives
Lump Sum
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Delayed Lump Sum
(5)
(6)

Demographic

Male
Married
Age
Education (yrs)
Optimistic Life Exp.

-0.129

1.048

0.632

-0.164

0.718

0.281

(0.728)

(0.689)

(0.733)

(0.710)

(0.689)

(0.728)

1.620**

0.096

0.125

0.954

-0.188

0.084

(0.731)

(0.695)

(0.725)

(0.713)

(0.695)

(0.720)

0.153***

0.052

0.121

0.097**

0.021

0.109**

(0.044)

(0.042)

(0.046)

(0.043)

(0.042)

(0.046)

-0.261*

-0.028

-0.039

-0.317**

-0.142

-0.112

(0.144)

(0.136)

(0.152)

(0.140)

(0.136)

(0.151)

0.39

6.052***

6.598***

-0.01

4.232***

5.082***

(1.488)

(1.439)

(1.467)

(1.451)

(1.439)

(1.456)

-0.201***

-0.207***

-0.151***

-0.159***

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.011)

Experimental

Total Work SQ
Saw Lump Sum First

(0.012)

-1.614**

-1.432**

(0.665)

(0.660)

-0.413

-2.203*

(1.138)

(1.130)

-1.947**

-3.214***

(0.892)

(0.886)

0.170

-0.414

(0.732)

(0.727)

Economic

Wealth 50-100K
Wealth 100K+
Other Annuity
Benefit at Age 62
Long Tenure (10y+)
High Debt

1.135

1.358

(0.886)

(0.880)

-1.153

-3.114**

(1.419)

(1.409)

1.576**

1.755**

(0.737)

(0.732)

0.827**

1.036***

(0.350)

(0.348)

Attitudes/Preferences

Risk Aversion
Long Term Planner
Risky Investing
High Expected Return
High Spending
Financial Literacy
High Political Trust

0.454

0.500

(0.723)

(0.718)

0.137

-1.195

(1.087)

(1.080)

0.540

-0.312

(1.037)

(1.030)

0.649

0.233

(0.993)

(0.986)

0.994

2.855**

(1.259)

(1.250)

-1.701**

-2.027***

(0.709)

(0.704)

R-squared
0.008
0.119
0.133
0.005
0.071
0.098
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between the number of months of fulltime work in the Lump Sum vs. the
Status Quo scenario. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. N = 2451. See Appendix for
variable descriptions. Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table A1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Name
Claiming Age SQ
Claiming Age LS
Claiming Age DLS
Diff LSSQ
Diff DLSSQ
Lump Sum LS
Lump Sum DLS
Work Hours SQ
Total Work SQ
Work Hours LS
Total Work LS
Work Hours DLS
Total Work DLS
Diff LSSQ Work
Diff DLSSQ Work
Male
Married
Age
Education (yrs)
Optimistic Life Exp.
Saw Lump Sum First
Wealth 50-100K
Wealth 100K+
Other Annuity
Benefit at Age 62
Long Tenure (10y+)
High Debt
Risk Aversion
Long Term Planner
Risky Investing
High Expected Return
High Spending
Financial Literacy
High Political Trust

22

Variable Description
Claiming Age in Status Quo scenario (in months after age 62)
Claiming Age in Lump Sum scenario (in months after age 62)
Claiming Age in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (in months after age 62)
Difference between claiming age in Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Claiming Age LS - Claiming Age SQ)
Difference between claiming age in Delayed Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Claiming Age DLS - Claiming
Age SQ)
Lump sum payment (in $) R receives in Lump Sum scenario at claiming age (Claiming Age LS)
Lump sum payment (in $) R receives in Delayed Lump Sum scenario at claiming age (Claiming Age DLS)
Weekly work hours in Status Quo scenario (0 for Claiming Age SQ = 0)
Months of fulltime work in Status Quo scenario (0 for Claiming Age SQ = 0)
Weekly work hours in Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age LS = 0)
Months of fulltime work in Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age LS = 0)
Weekly work hours in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age DLS = 0)
Months of fulltime work in Delayed Lump Sum scenario (0 for Claiming Age DLS = 0)
Difference between months of full-time work in Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Total Work LS - Total Work
SQ)
Difference between months of full-time work in Delayed Lump Sum and Status Quo scenario (Total Work DLS Total Work SQ)
= 1 if R is male; 0 else
= 1 if R is married; 0 else
R's age
R's years of education
Difference between R's subjective and his objective22 probability of living to target age [75, 80, 85], for Rs age
[<65, 65-69, 69+]
= 1 if R saw Lump Sum alternative first; 0 if R saw Delayed Lump Sum alternative first
= 1 if R's household financial wealth is between $50,000 and $100,000; 0 else
= 1 if R's household financial wealth is above $100,000; 0 else
= 1 if R is/will be receiving any pension other than Social Security now/in the future; 0 else
R's estimated monthly Social Security benefit at age 62 ($ ’000)
= 1 if R worked for pay more than 10 yrs; 0 else
= 1 if R would use 50%+ of additional $10,000 to pay off credit card/other debt; 0 else
Standardized (mean 0, std 1) risk aversion index, calculated as described in the online appendix of
Brown/Kapteyn/Luttmer/Mitchell (2013).
= 1 if R makes financial plans for next 5 yrs and more; 0 else
= 1 if R would invest 50%+ in stocks/real estate; 0 else
= 1 if R expects investment return of 7%+; 0 else
= 1 if R would use 50%+ of additional $10,000 to spend; 0 else
Percentage of financial literacy questions answered correctly
= 1 if R is somewhat/very confident in the Social Security system’s sustainability; 0 else

Mean
45.0
49.6
53.3
4.6
8.4

Median
38
48
60
0
0

73026
22449
24.5
34.8
24.8
36.2
24.2
38.7
1.4

64498
1596
30
32
27
35
25
36
0

3.9

0

0.41
0.60
55.6
14.6
-0.14

0
1
56
14
-0.109

0.50
0.11
0.42
0.51
1.194
0.93
0.37
0.0

1
0
0
1
1.153
1
0
-0.007

0.40
0.89
0.12
0.15
0.75
0.55

0
1
0
0
1
1

Objective survival probability based on the Alternative 2 mortality probabilities used in the SSA's 2013 Trustees Report (Social Security Administration 2013).
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Figure A1: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Status Quo

Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 months)
in the Status Quo scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for monthly benefits, age and months show no
entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown.
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Figure A2: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Lump Sum Scenario

Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 months)
in the Lump Sum scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for lump sum, age and months show no entry and
the red arrow on the scale is not shown.
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Figure A3: Online Survey Screen Shot – Claiming Age under Delayed Lump Sum Scenario

Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his claiming age (here 67 and 7 months)
in the Delayed Lump Sum scenario. Prior to selecting an age, the text boxes for lump sum, age and months show no
entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown.
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Figure A4: Online Survey Screen Shot – Work Effort under Status Quo Scenario

Notes: Exemplary screen shot of survey as seen by respondent after selecting his work effort (24 hours per week) in
the Status Quo scenario (after having selected a claiming age of 67 years and 7 months on the previous screen). Prior
to selecting a work effort, the text boxes show no entry and the red arrow on the scale is not shown. The corresponding
question regarding work effort in the two lump sum alternatives had equal wordings and design.

